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Until very recently, the conventional wisdom was that the return to education was very high in 
Africa. However, some recent analysis point to low average returns to education in some 
African countries including Nigeria. Given these low returns to education, a relevant question 
is what causes low returns or what can cause changes in returns to education? In this paper, 
I examine the hypothesis that economic and political reforms can lead to increased returns to 
schooling using the case of Nigeria. Following the sudden death of military general Sanni 
Abacha, Nigeria moved to democracy in 1999, ending an over 15 years stretch of military 
rule. This move was followed by significant institutional and economic reforms, which provide 
an opportunity to examine the short term impact of reforms on returns to education. The 
average return to education is estimated using instrumental variables exploiting a quasi 
experiment in Nigeria. The results provide evidence that reforms implemented post 
democracy in Nigeria led to a 2.6% point increase in average returns to education. 
Furthermore, I find that the low average return to schooling in Nigeria reflects more the low 
returns at the primary and secondary levels. 
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 1 Introduction
Until very recently, the conventional wisdom was that the return to education in developing coun-
tries, especially Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) is much higher than the rest of the world. This view
is linked with the economic principle that the price of labor is higher if a skill is scarce and since
educated labor is scarce in Africa, it follows that the returns to education must be high. In addi-
tion, this hypothesis of high returns has been backed by micro evidence by Psacharopoulos (1994)
and several other authors who make use of ordinary least squares(OLS) to arrive at their ﬁndings.1
However, Card (1995), and Ashenfelter and Zimmerman (1997) have questioned the validity of many
of these OLS estimates of the returns to schooling. They argue that OLS estimates of returns can
be biased because of the endogenous nature of the schooling variable. Similarly, some instrumental
variable (IV) estimates have also been question based on the validity of the instruments used for
the analysis (see Staiger and Stock, 1997 and Card, 2001).
The possibility that returns to education for African countries could be less than previously
estimated was highlighted both by Bennell (1996) and Glewwe (1991). They both argue that
several of the earlier papers on Africa are ﬂawed. Moreover, they state that Psacharopoulos’ (1994)
conclusion on African countries relies heavily on dated studies and unreliable data, and that a more
careful Mincer type estimation of returns to education for similar countries reveals modest eﬀects.
What are the key factors that are contributing to low returns to schooling in SSA? This is
an important question in light of the expectation of high returns in SSA. I highlight three possible
explanations for low returns to schooling in SSA. These three explanations are in no way exhaustive.
The ﬁrst reason is lack of physical capital and investments to complement skilled human capital.
Poor school quality leading to minimal human capital accumulation and low returns to schooling is
the second possible explanation. The third explanation for low return is labor market failures due to
instability, bad policy choice, poor institution, and dysfunctional government. This is the argument
I explore in this paper. Apart from these three explanations, low average return to education
estimates might reﬂect the heterogeneity in returns to education across regions in a country and
also disparities in returns to education at diﬀerent levels of education. In this case, low returns to
education in a region or at a level of education, that a good portion of the population belong to,
may lead to a low average return even though high returns may exist in other regions or at other
levels of education.
Labor market failures due to poor policy choice by a repressive government, political instability,
1see Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) for a list of papers ﬁnding very high returns to education in Africa
2missing markets and poor institutions can all lead to low returns to schooling. Labor market failures
in this context refers to a situation in which several factors including political regime and the ac-
tions and policy choices they make cause earnings not to reﬂect the market rate. Alternatively, labor
market failures exit when wages do not reﬂect the marginal products of both skilled and unskilled
workers. This potential explanation of low return to schooling is theoretically and empirically cred-
ible. Fleisher et al, (2005) noted the impact of reforms in the labor market on returns to education
in many East European countries and Russia. The Nigerian case presents another opportunity to
check for evidence for change in returns post signiﬁcant reform. The sudden move to democracy
and the concomitant institutional and economic reform furnish a natural experiment to test the
validity of this explanation on why returns can be low and what can lead to an increase overtime.
This is especially apt because there is documented evidence of serious political, economic and labor
market problems during the repressive military rules in Nigeria (see Sanda et al, 1987) and evidence
of substantial economic and institutional change post democratic reform.2
Towards this end, I seek to answer one question:
1. Did returns to education change signiﬁcantly post 1999 (democracy) and can we attribute this
change in returns if it exists to democratic reforms or does this change reﬂect other confounding
factors that coincide with the post democracy period?
To answer this question I test three null hypotheses. First, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence be-
tween returns to education pre and post democracy in Nigeria. Second, there is no diﬀerential
change in returns to education across levels of education post democratic reform in Nigeria.
Third, there is no diﬀerential change in returns to education across occupation sectors post
democratic reform in Nigeria.
These three hypothesis along with other econometric analysis are the basis of identifying the eﬀect
of democratic reforms on returns to education. The results from this question can aid our under-
standing of what may have led to low returns to education in Nigeria and what factors can cause a
change in this return.
The approach used to test the ﬁrst hypothesis is to compare the Mincerian earnings function
(Mincer, 1974) estimate of the average returns to schooling using instrumental variable (IV) prior
and post economic reform and institutional change in Nigeria. As these changes and reforms came
with the move to democracy, this analysis is equivalent to comparing returns in two diﬀerent political
2See Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, (2007) or Uwaifo (2008d)
3regimes in Nigeria. One regime is characterized by extractive institutions, labor market failures, poor
policies and political instability (Military Rule) and the other regime (Democratic) characterized
by political stability and large scale economic and institutional reforms. The instrument used is the
length of exposure to a free education program in Nigeria. The variation in the instrument comes
from exogenous withdrawal and implementation of the program across regions over time (see Osili
and Long (2008) and Uwaifo (2007)). This ﬁrst hypothesis alone is just a test of diﬀerences in labor
market outcomes across two periods in time and does not on its own provide evidence of the eﬀect
of democratic reform as this diﬀerence could be due to trend eﬀects or other confounding factors
coinciding with either of the periods being compared.
Following the test of the ﬁrst hypothesis, I next provide detailed arguments on why the pre and
post comparison reﬂects changes due to democratic reform in Nigeria. I conduct diﬀerent tests to
show why this change is not driven by simple trend eﬀects and confounding factors. In addition
to these arguments, the second and third hypothesis are further tests that changes post 2000 can
be linked to democratic reform. Given that many of the initial democratic reforms were aimed
at certain groups in the population, I expect signiﬁcantly bigger changes in returns to education
across these groups in comparison to other groups. Speciﬁcally, I test for diﬀerence in returns to
education across levels of education and across occupational sectors of the economy. Many of the
reforms that can have short term beneﬁts were geared towards those with higher levels of education
and biased against those at lower levels of education. Hence, if changes post 2000 are linked to
democratic reform, we should ﬁnd unequal changes in returns to education across education levels
with signiﬁcantly higher increases for those with higher education in comparison to those at other
levels. Similarly, one of the signiﬁcant reforms post democracy was an increase in the minimum
wage and a nonuniform wage reform implemented by the Federal Government. The wage increase
was nonuniform with much larger increases to the senior more educated staﬀ and smaller increases
for the junior staﬀ with lower levels of education. This wage reform led to a similar wage reform
by the state government. Many big companies also had to raise wages for the educated to remain
competitive and curb attrition to the government sector. Given this wage reform, one expects
bigger changes in returns to education for wage workers than those who are self employed. More
speciﬁcally if changes in returns is really due to democratic reform, we should see that government
workers should have the biggest change in returns to education, followed by company workers. In
contrast, those who are self employed should have the lowest change in returns to education if any.
It is important to mention that unlike the ﬁrst hypothesis where the IV leads us to consistent
4estimates of the returns to schooling, the estimates of the returns at diﬀerent levels of education
have the potential to be biased because an IV strategy is not implemented. An IV strategy cannot
be implemented in this case because suitable instruments for each level of education is lacking. I do
not too worried about this issue because for in this paper I am concerned with a change in returns
and not the absolute magnitude of the return to each level of education. As long as the bias in
the estimates is not time variant, the identiﬁcation strategy and the inferences based on this result
should be valid. In my analysis, ability is the primary omitted variable which could bias the estimate
of the returns to education at each level of education but ability should not be time variant in a
birth cohort of a population. Besides, when I compare OLS and IV estimates of average returns to
education, I do not ﬁnd substantial bias in OLS estimates. This could imply that OLS estimate of
the returns at diﬀerent levels of education should not have substantial bias.
The results suggest that average returns to education diﬀered signiﬁcantly across the two political
regimes. With a 2.6 percentage point increase post democracy. I provide econometric evidence
suggesting that this diﬀerence is not due to simple trends, changing population or a confounding
eﬀect like the oil boom in Nigeria post 2003. Instead, the diﬀerence is due to democratic reform.
With respect to the three hypothesis tested, I ﬁnd that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the change
in returns to education across levels of education. Speciﬁcally, the wage reform and policies directed
towards skilled labor in Nigeria, along with the change in investment climate, all play a signiﬁcant
role in the 6.2 percentage point increase in the returns to tertiary education, post reforms which
stands in contrast with the 0 percent increase at the secondary level and the 1.1 percentage point
increase at the primary level. Also, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences across occupation sectors in the
change in returns to education, wage workers experienced signiﬁcantly higher increase in returns
in comparison to those who were self-employed. Similarly, those who work for the government had
a higher increase in returns than those who worked in the private formal sector and the informal
sector. Speciﬁcally, returns increases by 2.4 percentage point for government workers while returns
only increased by 0.8 percentage point for those in the private formal sector.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing some answers for important questions
regarding low returns to education in Africa. The literature on schooling has not really emphasized
the question of low returns to education because, prior to Uwaifo (2006), private average return
to education in Africa was predicted to be high. However, identifying factors that can lead to low
returns to education is not just informative for labor economists but can also serve as a guide to
policy choices that deal with this problem and preventing future reoccurrence. In addition, the
5results suggest another possible explanation for low returns to education, poor government, policies
and institutions. Also, the paper provides evidence of the short-term impact of reforms post a change
in political institutions and regime on returns to schooling. There have been many theoretical papers
on the impact of regime or institutional change on welfare. This paper would add to the limited
literature providing empirical evidence of the impact of reforms on returns to education within a
developing country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: In the next section, I highlight some relevant
literature and in Section 3 I give a brief history on Nigeria and provide arguments why regime
change can aﬀect returns. In Section 4, I describe the data I use and present descriptive analysis. In
Section 5, the identiﬁcation strategy, econometric analysis and results are highlighted. Implications,
a summary of the results and policy recommendations are in the last section.
2 Related Literature
The positive cross-sectional correlation between schooling and labor market earning is one of the
most studied and most stable economic relationships. However in the past, there was little in the
literature that focused on low returns to schooling. This apparent dearth in the early literature
might be linked with the fact that most estimates of returns to schooling have been moderate or
high (generally above 6 percent for every extra year of schooling).3
More recently, some authors have noted low returns to schooling, both in the developed and the
developing world but only a subgroup of this authors have been able to explain the possible reason
for the low or changing returns to education in these countries. Fleisher et al (2005) explore the
pace of increase in return to schooling during the transition from planning to market economies over
time and across several Central and Eastern European countries, Russia, and China. Their analysis
makes use of metadata from 33 studies of ten transition economies covering a period from 1975
through 2002. Interestingly, they ﬁnd that most of these transition economies had very low returns
to education until the 90s. Estimated returns before reform were less than 5% in all countries except
Hungary and Slovenia, which operated under considerably less rigid economic regimes than did most
of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia (CEER). More importantly, they ﬁnd that
post-economic reform and change in institutions consistent with a move towards a market economy,
returns to education rose signiﬁcantly in these countries. Fleisher et al (2005) attribute low returns
to education in these economies in the past to the planned schemes of wage compression and rigid
3High return to education has been noted in developing countries especially Africa.
6economic regimes and nonmarket prior to transition.
A similar paper by Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova (2005) investigates why returns to schooling
in Russia and Ukraine diverged over the transition despite identical initial conditions and similar
skill composition of employment. In 2002, the estimated return to schooling is two times less in
Ukraine at 4.5% than in Russia at 9.2%. They conclude, based on rigorous semi-parametric analysis,
that this diﬀerence is due to price diﬀerences in both countries. They claim the price diﬀerences are
likely linked with lower demand for educated labor, more limited labor mobility, higher separation
costs, and the larger role played by trade unions in Ukraine. These factors are linked with the fact
that Ukraine made very few structural reforms compared to Russia until 1997 and only after 1997
did the speed of reforms in Ukraine accelerate and the scope widen (Linn, 2001).
Low return to schooling was also noted in a Western Europe country. Fuenta and Jimeno (2005)
looking at 14 member states of the European Union, construct estimates of the private return to an
additional year of schooling for an individual of average attainment, taking into account the eﬀects
of education on wages and employment probabilities. Low return to education was noted in Sweden
and this was attributed to the country’s compressed wage structure. This wage structure is similar
to the wage grid situation in most of East Europe and Russia before the transition reforms.
There are also other recent ﬁndings on low return to schooling in developing countries. Aranki
(2005) and Daoud (2005) found extremely low returns to education in Palestine (between 2-3%).
Aranki’s possible explanation for this low return was the Palestinian labor force dependency on
Israeli jobs. As Palestinian jobs in Israel are predominantly low skilled, the Israeli demand for
Palestinian labor may explain the low returns to schooling in Palestine. He also notes that many
other factors are possible (see Angrist, 1995 and Daoud, 2005 for further discussion). In Pakistan,
Mohammed (2006) notes low returns to schooling. In this study, he estimates returns to schooling
for male income earners between the ages of 25 and 59 in Pakistan, using data from the Pakistan
Integrated Household Survey. He ﬁnds a low return to an extra year of schooling. His suggested
explanations are a macroeconomic environment that does not require high-skilled labor, or poor
quality of schooling in Pakistan that does not equip students with the necessary skills to facilitate
increased productivity and earnings. However, he calls for further investigation to pinpoint which of
these factors is truly to blame for the low returns. In addition, Zhang et al (2005) note low returns of
2.7% in urban China using a within-twin-pair ﬁxed eﬀects model. Given the high previously noted
estimates, Zhang et al suggest that much of the estimated returns to education in China, found in
previous studies, are due to omitted ability or the family eﬀect.
7With respect to Africa, which is traditionally expected to have the highest returns, Collier and
Gunning (1997) note that there are no statistical ﬁndings that support the eﬀect of education on
increasing farm productivity in SSA. Glewwe (1996) also notes zero average returns to private wage
workers in Ghana.4 In Uwaifo (2006), a quasi experiment in Nigeria is exploited and estimates of the
return to education in this country using both the instrumental variable (IV) strategy and ordinary
least squares (OLS) are derived. The results are surprising. The average return to education in
Nigeria (a country that holds one ﬁfth of the African population) is not higher than the return for
countries in the developed world. In fact, the return to education is actually quite low for both private
and public sector workers (about 2.7% for every extra year of schooling.). Her estimate is about
nine percentage points lower than the previously estimated average return in Africa (Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos, 2004 estimate that the return for SSA is about 12%). She also notes signiﬁcant
time diﬀerences in returns to education.5 Her results in general are consistent with the observed
stagnation and decline in school enrolment in several SSA countries in the 90s. She suggests that
the rise in international migration in the 90s and the move to rent seeking activities, may both point
to individuals making rational responses to disappointing beneﬁts or returns to education in many
African countries.6 Apart from the above papers, there are other papers that ﬁnd low and medium
returns in Africa (see Uwaifo 2008c for a review on returns to education in Africa) but the lingering
question is still why the low returns. Given the important potential implications of low returns to
education, it is necessary to try to understand what can lead to low returns to education or what
can cause returns to education to change signiﬁcantly. I highlight a few of these reasons below.
The ﬁrst possible reason for the low return mentioned above is the lack of complementary
physical capital and investment for the human capital base in Nigeria.7 This argument implies that
the return to schooling is low because there is little physical capital and technology to combine
with human capital to generate output and increase income. Hence, most of the human capital,
embodied in individuals, is dormant and unproductive and can lead to the low returns to education
observed. This argument makes sense theoretically but is also not the explanation in Nigeria for
several reasons. First in Uwaifo (2006), she ﬁnds time diﬀerences in returns to education in Nigeria.
However, there is no systematic relationship between these time diﬀerences in returns to schooling
4Glewwe assumes the zero return to schooling could have been a result of measurement errors biasing estimates of
returns towards zero, however, the positive returns for government workers in the same country, tends to contradict
this argument.
5The return to education dropped by over 10% point from the 80s to the 90s.
6See Akokpari (1998) and The International Organization for Migration (IOM) (1992), Report of the Conference
on International Migration, Geneva for information on migration from Africa.
7This view is well documented in Adam’s (2001) look at Tanzania.
8and measures/indicators of gross physical capital or technology.8 Moreover, those in industries
and sectors with adequate physical capital and technology to complement their human capital had
returns to education similar to others who lacked this complementary input. Hence, though capital
and investments might have a role to play in driving increased returns to schooling, they do not for
the most part explain the drastic fall in the returns to education in Nigeria in the 90s .
Low quality of education, though a common explanation for low returns, cannot also be an
important explanation of this phenomenon in Nigeria for two reasons. First, Uwaifo (2006) notes that
the return to education is not statistically diﬀerent for diﬀerent birth cohorts in Nigeria. Speciﬁcally,
the older cohorts who, based on recent ﬁndings, are supposed to have gotten better education before
the massive expansion in the 70s, also had returns to education equally as low as the later cohorts9
Although diﬀerent cohorts may have diﬀerent education experiences in terms of quality over the
last 50 years in Nigeria, all exhibit similar patterns of low returns to schooling. In addition, Uwaifo
(2006) argues that low quality of education in Nigeria cannot be the main issue since individuals
would not have been able to transfer their skills, from their education in Nigeria, to the developed
world and get comparable jobs with much higher returns, if quality of education was very low (See
Kollehlon and Eule, 2003). The transfer of skills from Nigeria to other countries, as occurred in the
90s, suggests that quality of education could not have been that low though quality of education
might be better in some other parts of the world.10
The view that the low return to education can mask marked geopolitical diﬀerence is plausible.
Many regions could have really low returns and a few regions have high or average returns. Hence, the
average return is low for the country as a whole. The potential of heterogeneity across regions within
a country, biasing the average returns to education downwards, was investigated in Uwaifo (2008a)
using a similar instrument as was used in Uwaifo (2007). The results show minimal geopolitical
diﬀerences in returns to schooling in Nigeria even though other important economic diﬀerences exist
across regions.
In addition, it is also possible that the low average return to schooling masks substantial hetero-
geneity in returns to education across levels of education. The argument here is that the relationship
between years of schooling and income is nonlinear and increasing with the years of schooling. Hence,
the return to an extra year of primary education is much less than the return to a year of secondary
8Examples of such indicators are, gross capital formation or gross investment.
9There is anecdotal evidence that the massive expansion in enrollment in the 70s was not matched with similar
expansion in infrastructure and teachers which reduced the quality of education.
10We know based on the literature that improved quality of education can increase returns to schooling. However,
in Nigeria the bigger problem seems to be within quality diﬀerences in contrast to general low quality of education.
9education and the return to an extra year of tertiary education is the highest. However, since edu-
cation attainment in Nigeria is still low and most people have primary education or less, then the
average return will be more of a reﬂection of the return to primary education. This opinion that the
average return to schooling is low because of divergence returns across levels, with low returns at the
primary level with greater population concentration and higher returns to secondary and tertiary
education with fewer people, has support in the literature. Schultz (2004) ﬁnds that private returns
in six African countries are highest today at the secondary and post secondary levels and low at the
primary level. In Schultz’s (2001) Ghana study, he observed this increasing pattern in returns to
education. He reports estimates of return to schooling of about 4 percent, 10 percent and 16 percent
for primary, secondary and post-secondary schooling respectively. His explanation is that serious
bottleneck to education occurs at the secondary and post-secondary school level making demand for
secondary and tertiary graduates much higher than supply of these graduates leading to high returns
for this group (see Schultz, 1988). However, recent World Bank studies on youth unemployment
in several SSA countries point to higher levels of unemployment among tertiary institution grad-
uates (see World Bank, 2007). This ﬁnding questions the opinion that the demand for secondary
and tertiary graduates is more than the supply. High levels of unemployment among those with
higher levels of education, should not exist if labor supply is less than labor demand at these levels.
Although Schultz’s explanation for high returns at the secondary and tertiary level might not be
appropriate for many countries in SSA, his view on returns is consistent with evidence from Ghana
and Burkina Faso (see Glewee, 1991 and Kalzianaga, 2004). Aromolaran’s (2004) results on Nigeria
are partly diﬀerent from Schultz ﬁndings. He ﬁnds a low return to both secondary and primary
education and a high return to tertiary education.
There is also evidence of a totally opposite trend in returns to education across levels. In
the past, the theoretical expectation was that the return to schooling falls as students extend their
years of schooling into higher educational levels (Becker, 1964; Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985).
This expectation was backed by micro evidence by Psacharaopoulos and Woodhall (1985) who ﬁnd
returns are highest at primary level and decrease at secondary and postsecondary levels. The
contradictory evidence above may point to diﬀerences across countries in the relationship between
school attainment and income. However, it is hard to come up with any general conclusion on these
diﬀerences because of the potential bias in the returns to schooling at diﬀerent levels of education.
Most estimates of returns to diﬀerent levels of education in SSA are derived using OLS estimation
of the wage equation. Hence, estimates can suﬀer from selectivity and omitted variables bias.
10Lastly, the view that institutions or governance can aﬀect the returns to education ties indirectly
with the political economy literature. For example, Acemoglu et al (2004) considers the relationship
between democracy and education. The impact of changing government/institutions11 on economic
indicators has also been considered in the literature theoretically (see Acemoglu et al, 2001). Re-
cently, there is an increased interest in case studies and empirical papers considering the impact of
institutions/mode of government and change in institutions on economic indicators. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2000), Acemoglu et al (2004), Rodrik and Rigobon (2004), Minier (1998) and Glaeser et
al (2004) are other examples of papers considering this relationship. However, most of these papers
consider the eﬀect of a change in institution or government on income and inequality. Fleisher et al
(2005) on the other hand is one of the few papers that tries to explain the impact of reforms, that
come along with institutional change, on returns to schooling in a multi-country analysis.
3 Nigeria Pre and Post democracy
3.1 A Brief History
For most of her independent life, Nigeria has been controlled by the military government, which
continued the extractive institutions established through colonial rule. The military government ﬁrst
took over in 1966 toppling the elected civilian regime in a coup d’etat. Several authors have written
on the military government in Nigeria and its negative impact on every sector of the economy.12
Between 1986 and 1998, Nigeria experienced its worst political regimes since its independence.
Political instability, pervasive corruption and poor military government with extractive institutions
and weak policy choices were the hallmarks of this period. Besides, labor markets were stiﬂed and
wages were sometimes compressed and controlled by the military government. The last military
regime is known to be the most oppressive, corrupt and divisive.13 This regime ended abruptly with
the death of General Sanni Abacha on the 8th of June 1998.
The death of a person is usually a thing of sorrow, but not for many Nigerians who saw a ray
of hope for the future with the demise of Abacha (from whose family has been recovered at least
US$770 million of stolen state cash) and the beginning of transition to democracy. The transition
government lasted until May 1999. It was led by General Abdusalam Abubakar, a high-ranking
commander in the late general’s cabinet. It was a period of setting up the institutional and political
11North (1991) deﬁnes institutions as the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. He emphasizes that institution structure incentive in human exchange,
whether political, social, or economic.
12Examples of authors on this subject are Dibie (2000), Nwagwu (2002)& Sanda et al (1987).
13The low return to education in Nigeria documented in Uwaifo (2006) was observed over the period of this regime.
11framework for the shift to democracy. Also during this period, some drastic economic reforms
were initiated. In May 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo became the president of Nigeria, ushering in the
present democratic dispensation. The period between 1999 to present has been the longest stretch
of democratic government in Nigeria.14
Four year after his ﬁrst term, Obasanjo was reelected to serve another term.15 Lewis and Bratton
(2000) noted from their survey of Nigeria that Nigerians are generally very positive about the move
to democracy. Based on their study in January and February 2000, four out of ﬁve Nigerians
expressed relative trust in the government, with nearly a third aﬃrming they trust the president a
lot. The political stability, and economic and labor market reforms in Nigeria after over ten years
of instability and labor market failures are one of the obvious outcomes post democracy that might
explain the trust in the government. In 2007 Nigeria swore in its next democratic president. This is
the ﬁrst time in Nigeria’s history as a nation that it has had two consecutive civilian governments
and is a sign of the changes in the political and institutional landscape of the country.
Though there were signiﬁcant policy and institutional reforms post democracy, there are diﬀer-
ences in opinion on the welfare impact of the shift. Generally, anecdotal and data evidence leans
more in favor of positive welfare impacts. In Figure 1 for example, the kernel density of log income
in 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2005 are presented. The rightward shift in density post democracy (2000
and 2005) is apparent. However, I do not focus on general welfare impacts of the shift to democracy
in this paper. The question of interest is if labor market outcomes have changed post the reforms
initiated from May, 1999. To answer this question I focus on estimating the change in returns to
education post democratic reform in Nigeria.
3.2 Why Low Returns to Education can be Explained by Political Regime and
Policy Choices in Nigeria
The return to education in Nigeria was low for most parts of the 90s during the military regime;
in fact it was near zero for household heads in 1992 (see Uwaifo, 2006). However, this same study
provides evidence of high returns for household heads in the mid 80s, (over 10% for every extra year
of schooling).16 The natural question to ask is why the return to schooling dropped? During the
military regimes between 1986 and 1998, Nigeria was politically and economically unstable. First,
interference in the labor market by the military government led to a situation where wages of skilled
14The previous democratic government lasted four years between 1979-1983.
15The fact that the president won a re-election provides anecdotal evidence to his performance during his ﬁrst term
and the speed with which economic reforms occurred in Nigeria during this period.
16Interestingly the downward trend in returns to education coincides with the downward trend in political stability
in Nigeria post 1985.
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and unskilled workers sometimes did not reﬂect relative marginal productivity. For example, this
period in Nigeria was characterized by wage compression, underpaid workers and ﬁxed wages in the
large government sector though living costs were rising. Another market failure was job assignment
based on social network. Most political positions and government contracts were assigned based
on social network instead of qualiﬁcation. In addition, institutions and legal-regulatory constraints,
linked with military governance directly and indirectly created labor market instability, which further
contributed to labor market failures. Lastly, political instability, weak policy choices, poorly deﬁned
property rights and inadequate enforcement of these rights by the military government stiﬂed foreign
and local investments. The direct eﬀect of these investment constraints was reduced opportunities
in the labor market that led to a labor supply-demand mismatch in some sectors. Excess supply of
any kind of skilled labor can lead to low returns to education.17
17For more details on Nigeria under the military and the economic and institutional impact see Adejumobi (1995)
and Soyinka (1997).
13One way to ﬁnd out if low return to education can be explained by political regimes with poor
policy choices is to compare Nigeria with and without the critical issues highlighted above. The
move to democracy and the large-scale economic reform that followed provides an opportunity for
such a comparison. This is possible for several reasons. First, the period following democracy has
been characterized by major economic and labor market reforms. Several reforms were eﬀected and
regulation were put in place to ensure that political and non political appointments and government
contracts are awarded only based on expertise and education unlike in the past when it was more
arbitrary and linked mostly to social networks. Second, education was made a top priority in Nigeria
post-democracy. In an attempt to salvage a sector so badly handled during the military years, the
government encouraged school enrollment, through the UBE (Universal Basic Education), a program
that makes school tuition free up to junior secondary school. The government also revamped the
education testing boards at the higher levels of education to improve quality and transparency. Also,
in an attempt to reward human capital and curb brain drain, the government signiﬁcantly increased
the wages of skilled capital in federal government services to more closely reﬂect their productivity.
As noted in Uwaifo (2008b), another noticeable democratic reform was the over 100% increase in
the Federal minimum wage for civil service workers in 2000. This was followed by increases in
state minimum wage for civil service worker. Also a national minimum wage law was enacted that
raises the national minimum wage dramatically from the monthly equivalent of 2.2 US dollars to
ﬁfty US dollars (250 to 5,500 Naira). In addition to this minimum wage increases, was a general
nonuniform increase in wages across government employees, favoring more educated workers. The
ﬁrst minimum wage amendments did not satisfy the national labor union and was followed by
subsequent minimum wage increases in 2001.18 As expected, these substantial wage increases had
ripple eﬀect in the private sector (see Folawewo (2007) for more on the impact of wage increases in
Nigeria). Unlike in the military rule, civil service now became an attractive option for new graduates
and workers already in the labor force. Hence, the wage rate in the private formal sector had to
rise higher than in the public sector in some occupation categories to prevent a movement of higher
ability/ skilled workers who typically were in the private sector to government service.19 As with
any minimum wage policy, one would expect that there may be an eﬀect on employment rates.
Folawewo (2007) investigates this macroeconomic eﬀect using a general equilibrium framework and
his results are mixed. A possible reason why the wage increase had no consistent negative eﬀect,
18The minimum wage in dollars per month for Federal and State Government workers in 2000 was approximately
US$60 US$50 and increased by 15% in 2002.
19An exception to most highly skilled workers being in the private sector are university professors who were all in
the public sector as all universities were government owned until very recently.
14on employment across sectors, was the concurrent increase in demand for labor. This increase in
demand for labor is linked to programs implemented post democratic reform that created new jobs
and provided incentives for entry of many international and local ﬁrms.
Another big change in Nigeria post democratic reform is the business climate. This change
further eased the school to work transition of many college graduates who typically before democracy,
found it diﬃcult to ﬁnd jobs. Post 1999, several international ﬁrms returned to Nigeria and new
international and local ﬁrms entered the market.20These changes created an unprecedented increase
in the demand for highly skilled labor. There was also an increase in the demand for unskilled
workers as support staﬀ like drivers, cooks, messengers for these new companies. This entry of
new ﬁrms is due to the large-scale economic reforms, political stability and drastic change in the
investment climate in Nigeria post democracy, in addition to the existence of a very skilled local
labor force. A few examples of reforms post democracy include the privatization of some key public
enterprizes, liberalization of key sectors of the economy, and restructuring of the public service.
The phenomenal growth in the telecommunication sector and the substantial increase in demand
for skilled labor in the private sector, are the most publicized examples on the impact of reforms on
labor markets and the economy in post democratic Nigeria (see Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako,
(2007) for a detailed analysis on reforms in Nigeria post democracy).
4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
4.1 Data Description
This study makes use of cross-sectional data from the General Household Survey (GHS) of Nigeria.
The GHS is one of the major sample surveys carried out by the federal oﬃce of statistics (FOS). The
survey sample was drawn randomly from all the 36 states in Nigeria including the federal capital
territory. It is the only survey in Nigeria that resembles the Living Standards Measurement Survey
(LSMS) of the World Bank in terms of coverage. For more information about the data see Uwaifo
(2006). I make use of data from 1997/1998, 1998/1999, 1999/2000 and 2005 for answering both
questions. The data contains information on 32,024 households in 1997/98 with 131,477 observa-
tions, 24,889 households in 1998/99 with 106,325 observations and 34,105 households in 1999/2000
with 149,411 observations, 28,268 households in 2005 with 97,689 observations. To ensure that the
20A classic example is the growth and expansion in the telecommunication sector triggered by the deregulation of the
sector as part of the democratic reforms. The sector now consist of both local and international ﬁrms like Intercellular,
Multi-links, Starcomms, G. S. Telecomm, Mobitel and Cellcom.
15Table 1: Summary Statistics
Year 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2005
(GHS) (GHS) (GHS) (GHS)
Observations 131,477 106,325 149,411 97,689
Age 23.486 23.32 23 22.98
(18.049) (18.21) (18.26) (18.5)
Sex 0.523 0.516 0.51 0.51
(male=1) (0.499) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Sector 0.241 0.236 0.22 0.23
(urban=1) (0.427) (0.425) (0.415) (0.418)
Years sch 4.17 4.14 4.68 5.06
(5.08) (5.136) (5.54) (5.61)
HH size 6.12 6.337 6.42 5.58
(3.34) (3.5) ( 3.49) (1.61)
Income 92.672 93.73 114.72 136.4
(298.298) (158.7) (305.82) (196.97)
data are comparable over time, current monetary values had to be deﬂated to base year prices.21
Table 1 shows summary statistics for each year I consider in this analysis.
Table 2: Real Mean Household Income Pre and Post Democracy
Zones 1998 1999 2000 2005
Pre Democracy Post Democracy
Mean(SE) Mean(SE) Mean(SE) Mean(SE)
No Education 79.28 76.91 87.12 104.98
(2.20) (1.30) (1.82) (1.46)
Some Primary 113.26 91.24 106.79 108.06
(18.63) (3.17) (4.45) (4.17)
Full Primary 94.38 97.97 117.78 120.7
(1.42) (1.73) (3.13) (2.11)
Full Secondary 113.82 120.98 119.96 163.20
(2.07) (2.24) (3.44) (2.82)
Tertiary 155.16 178.14 198.34 298.36
(3.98) (5.3) (5.2) (5.8)
4.2 Descriptive Evidence for Increase in Returns to Schooling
In Table 1, summary statistics are presented for Nigeria pre and post democracy. These statistics
provide evidence for the similarities pre and post democratic reform in basic demographic character-
21The base year is 1985.
16istics. In addition, the similarities across years make comparisons between time periods reasonable.
The results show that years of schooling have increased by almost a year post democracy. This
increase is expected though notable given the eﬀorts made to emphasize education post democracy.
Table 1 also provides clear evidence that general welfare has increased post democracy. Mean in-
come, an indicator of welfare has risen by about 40 Naira in real terms. This is substantial as in
current Naira this would be an increase in mean income of over 5800 Naira. Figure 1 also highlighted
this shift in mean income post democracy. Though this improvement in welfare is important, this
paper is focused on changes in beneﬁts/returns to education post democracy.
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Note: Dotted blue line is ﬁtted values post democracy (top plot) and black solid line is pre democracy (bottom plot).
There are several ways to check for descriptive evidence of possible change in returns to education
post democracy. Figure 2 is a graph of the ﬁtted values of log income in a regression of income
on schooling pre and post democracy. Though this is a simple linear prediction with no controls,
this ﬁgure provides some evidence of a level shift in income at all levels of school attainment post
democratic reform. In addition, the slope of the line has increased which may point to an increase
in returns to education post democracy. In Table 2, the mean income at each level of education for
17the four years being considered is summarized. In Table 3, the summary of mean income combining
data separately, pre and post democracy at diﬀerent levels of education is presented. First, Table 2
shows that mean income did not only increase post democracy (2000 and 2005) but also increased
progressively with education level. Table 3 column 4 highlights change in income at each education
level post democracy. This change increases with education level and is suggestive evidence of
increase return to education post democracy. Both tables show that people with tertiary education
beneﬁted the most in terms of changes to mean income post democracy. For example, the diﬀerence
in means income pre and post democracy for those with tertiary education is twice the diﬀerence
for those with full primary education or less. Hence, a non-linear increase in income by education
level post democracy is evident.
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Note: Dotted gold line is median spline post democracy (higher plot) and black solid line is median spline pre democracy (lower
plot).
To provide more evidence of this nonlinear increase post democracy, a graph of the median
spline income on years of schooling pre and post democracy is presented (see Figure 3). In this
ﬁgure, nonlinearities in returns to schooling is evident at the tertiary level of education. These
nonlinearities became more pronounced post democracy. The diﬀerence between the pre and post
18democracy graphs is obvious at the tertiary levels. In contrast, the diﬀerence between both periods
is small at at the primary -mid secondary level. The above descriptive evidence is strongly in
support of not just positive welfare changes after 1999, but also positive changes in terms of returns
to education. However, all the above evidence needs to be conﬁrmed with rigorous econometric
analysis before one can make a concrete inference and statement on if returns to education changed
post democracy, and if this change is simply a trend eﬀect, captures secondary confounding factors
or can be linked with democratic reform.
Table 3: Real Mean Household Income Pre and Post democracy
Zones Pre democracy(pooled) Post democracy(pooled) Diﬀerence
Mean(SE) Mean(SE)
No Education 78.24 93.81 15.57
(1.36) (1.27)
Some Primary 103.02 107.21 4.19
(10.07) (3.29)
Full Primary 95.92 119.0 23.08
(1.1) (2.03)
Full Secondary 117.02 151.55 34.53
(1.52) (2.27)
Tertiary 165.98 225.7 59.72
(3.28) (4.12)
5 Descriptive and Econometric Analysis and Results
5.1 Estimation Strategy to Test Hypothesis 1
As earlier stated, I focus on one broad questions in this paper. Did returns to education change
signiﬁcantly post 1999 (democracy) and can we attribute this change in returns if it exists to political
and labor market reforms or does this change reﬂect other confounding factors that coincide with
the post democracy period?
Given the nature of the question, I approach answering this question in three steps.
First I provide evidence that their is a signiﬁcant change in returns to education between the
two periods considered.
Step 2: Second I provide arguments both econometric and descriptive why this change is driven by
democratic reform in Nigeria and not other potential confounding factors.
Step 3: Third, I test three hypothesis that capture diﬀerential changes in returns to education post
democracy. This part of the analysis provides concrete evidence that the changes in returns to
education post democracy are linked with speciﬁc policies as part of the democratic reform.
19Step 1: Estimation and Results
I make use of IV analysis to derive consistent estimates of the returns to schooling. First as a
benchmark, the average return to schooling is estimated using OLS on a simple Mincer type earnings
function (equation 1), pre and post democracy. Meaning the return to education is estimated pooling
together data pre democracy then pooling together the post democracy data.
The average return to schooling estimated using OLS on equation (1), potentially suﬀers from
endogeniety and omitted variable bias. Hence, the return to schooling is re-estimated pre and post
democracy using an instrumental variable in a two stage least squares estimation of the equations
below (equations 1 and 2). The assumption here is that schooling Si is a function of several variables
including the instrument Zi. In all the estimations, potential heteroscedasticity is corrected for and
standard errors are clustered by birth cohort and state. In this analysis I focus on the cohorts born
before 1982. I explain the rationale for this restriction in section 5.4.
‘log(yi) = α + β1Si + β2Xi + β2X2 + β3Di + ǫi (1)
Si = λ0 + λ1Zi + λ2Pi + vi (2)
Here Xi is age of individual i, Si is years of schooling of individual, Di is a vector of all other
possible exogenous/control variables including dummies for individual i , Zi is the instrumental
variable while Pi is a vector which contains all other explanatory variables aﬀecting schooling, ǫi
and vi are uncorrelated error terms, α and λ0 are the intercept term and β1 is the estimate of
the return to education/schooling. Using OLS the estimate of β1 could be biased but with the IV
strategy, this estimate should be consistent. The need for regional controls in the wage equation
analysis was highlighted in Uwaifo (2007). The control variables we use in the regressions are age,
sector, sex and states. The estimates of the return to schooling pre and post democracy are then
compared for statistical diﬀerence. If β1pre = β1post then I fail to reject the null hypothesis but if
otherwise the null hypothesis is rejected.
The Instrument for Schooling
As mentioned earlier, the empirical strategy for estimating β1 requires an instrument. The instru-
ment used in this analysis is the length of exposure to the free education program in Nigeria. The
idea for an instrument linked with the exposure to free education came originally from the work of
20Osili and Long (2008), on the impact of education on fertility in Nigeria. I construct the instrument
in this paper in line with Uwaifo (2006).
The instrument is based on the length of time exposed to a free primary education program with
diﬀerent periods of implementation across states/regions. The program was designed to increase
educational attainment.22 The length and timing of exposure is based on program history as doc-
umented in the papers mentioned above and other historical facts on the program and education
expansion in Nigeria (see Fafunwa, 1974, Ozigi& Ocho, 1981 and Mazonde, 1995). The program
was initiated during colonial and military rule in Nigeria which is a good argument against the view
that implementation of the program was not exogenous and reﬂects individuals preferences.
A key factor that makes this a good instrument and creates variation in exposure is the ex-
ogenous implementation and withdrawal of the free education program across regions. Meaning
diﬀerent birth cohorts in diﬀerent regions and states were exposed to free education for diﬀerent
lengths of time. This information is then used to construct an instrument to predict schooling.
The UPE instrument satisﬁes the necessary characteristics of any good instrument because it is not
only relevant but also exogenous and satisﬁes exclusion restrictions.23 Details on the program, its
relevance and timeline are well documented in Osilli and Long (2008), Uwaifo (2006), Nwanchukwu
(1981) and Chuta (1986).
Table 4: Estimates of IV impact(1st Stage)
Independent Variable
Regime OLS IV R2 F
UPE Military NA 0.17* 0.36 1524.11
(0.009)
UPE Democracy NA 0.14* 0.33 1319.94
(0.01)
Note: *5% signiﬁcance level
5.2 Econometric Results
In Table 4, the ﬁrst stage regression estimates of the impact of the instrument on schooling are
presented. The impact of the UPE program pre democracy is similar to the estimates in Uwaifo
22The nation-wide version of this program was launched in 1976 and called Universal primary education (UPE).
23In Uwaifo (2007), arguments and rigorous analysis to support the validity of the instruments along these criteria
are provided to buttress the point that estimates of returns to education using this instrument are consistent.
21Table 5: Estimates of Returns to Schooling (2nd Stage)
Independent Variable
Regime OLS IV IV R2 F
Yrs of School Military 0.026* 0.031* 0.23 303.5
(0.001) (0.001)
Yrs of School Democracy 0.041* 0.057* 0.26 384.83
(0.001) (0.012)
Note: *5% signiﬁcance level
(2007). For the years post democracy, the impact is slightly smaller but is still substantial and
signiﬁcant. Table 5 captures the return to schooling estimates. The OLS estimates are also presented
as a benchmark. First, the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates in both cases. Such
a ﬁnding is not new in the literature and in Uwaifo (2007) this trend is noted when trying to
estimate the average returns to schooling between 1997-1999. Several reasons have been postulated
for this diﬀerence. Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Card (2001) demonstrate that OLS estimates
are typically lower than IV estimates as the downward bias resulting from measurement error is
often bigger than the upward bias due to omitted variables such as ability. This is especially
relevant in developing countries where we expect more measurement errors in variables such as
school attainment.
Anther possible reason for the IV estimates being higher is heterogeneity at the individual level
in returns to schooling. Here, the IV estimates will be upward biased. This diﬀerence between
OLS and IV estimates is not a major issue for these results. Similar to Uwaifo (2007), OLS and IV
estimates are not statistically diﬀerent
The return to an extra year of schooling for the cohort being considered pre democracy is 3.1%.
These estimates are slightly higher than the pre democracy estimates of the return to schooling in
Uwaifo (2007). In Uwaifo (2007), the estimate of return to education is 2.8%. Slight diﬀerences
in returns are expected since the result from Uwaifo (2007) is for the whole population. Here,
estimates over time for speciﬁc cohorts are derived and slight diﬀerences are possible. However, the
estimates in both cases are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. Post democracy, the return to education rose
substantially to 5.7%. Based on these results, I ﬁnd that the return to education has increased by
about three percentage points.24 The estimates of return to education pre and post democracy are
242.6 percentage point to be exact.
22statistically diﬀerent and substantial. Given this result, the ﬁrst null hypothesis is rejected. Returns
to education diﬀer between the pre and post democracy years. In addition, I cannot reject that OLS
is consistent. In the next section, I explain why the diﬀerence in pre and post returns to schooling
can provide evidence of the impact of democratic reform.
Evidence, Estimation and Results
The results in Table 4 and 5 show returns to education have changed when comparing 1998/1999
to 2000/2005. Next, I provide empirical and descriptive evidence that democratic reform led to this
change.
5.3 Step 2: Why a Pre and Post comparison is valid for identiﬁcation and the
Oil boom does not explain the Change
In this paper, a comparison of the returns to education pre and post democracy is the basis of the
identiﬁcation of the impact of democratic reform on returns to education. Although comparisons
like this might not be useful to identify the impact of a change generally, in the Nigerian case it is
possible for several reasons.
First, when comparing the two time periods, I can link all signiﬁcant changes in economic
indicators and factors that can aﬀect returns to education, post 1999 to democratic reform and the
signiﬁcant oil boom in Nigeria post 2003.25 Though I provide evidence in latter sections of the paper
indicating that the democratic wage reform had a signiﬁcant role to play in noted changes in returns
to education, I cannot attribute all the change in returns to this important reform. Meaning my
identiﬁcation strategy does not identify the unique impact of any particular democratic reform on
returns to education. Rather, I ﬁnd evidence for the impact of democratic reform generally, which
includes the wage reform and other polices. Also, I refrain from saying this is the eﬀect of democracy
per se. This is because a movement to democracy in another country might not have similar eﬀects
if similar policies are not implemented. Hence, my identiﬁcation strategy cannot disentangle the
labor market eﬀect of a change in institution (military to democratic) from the labor market eﬀect,
of the choice of policies implemented by the democratic government in Nigeria, some of which could
be implemented by a nondemocratic government.
As mentioned above, the only change that took place in Nigeria in the comparison periods apart
from democratic reforms, was the 2002 to present oil boom. One could argue that the increase in
25This conclusion is based on careful review of economic and policy accounts and papers on Nigeria between 2000
and 2005, and also reading through the documented political, economic and historical events that took place over this
time period.
23returns to education can be attributed to the oil boom and has nothing to do with the democratic
reform. This is a reasonable argument. However in the Nigerian case, one would expect that the
eﬀect of a rise in oil prices, if any , would be a level eﬀect or an attenuated eﬀect on returns to
education. Why is this so? First, oil is a national resource, the primary beneﬁciary of the rise in
oil prices is the Federal government and multinational corporations. Gains by multinational coop-
erations cannot lead to changes in returns to schooling because this sector employ an insigniﬁcant
proportion of the population and repatriate proﬁts thereby reducing the potential of indirect ben-
eﬁts. In addition, it is important to emphasize that substantial income beneﬁts arising from the
oil boom would only exist if the government transfers a part of this windfall into the economy via
subsequent wage increases, subsidies, transfers and other general government programs. These kinds
of transfers by the government should only lead to a level positive income eﬀect with no change in
returns to education. Changes in returns may only be noted with targeted transfers by the gov-
ernment to a particular subgroup like women or those with a particular level of education. In the
Nigerian case, there is no historic evidence that both general and targeted transfers by education,
post the oil boom, occurred. Up until 2006, the Nigerian government did not spend or invest the
surplus income from the oil windfall but rather used this surplus income to pay of its foreign debts
and grow its foreign reserve. The foreign reserve of Nigeria rose from 8 billion in 2002 to 54.8 billion
dollars in 2008.26
Second, Uwaifo (2006) ﬁnds that the return to education dropped during past oil booms in
Nigeria (1980 and 1992). The fall in returns during an oil boom is possible since beneﬁting from oil
windfalls in Nigeria is not correlated with education but rather belonging to certain social networks
connected with the governments. Moreover, these social networks prior to democracy were to a large
extent independent of education. Another reason why returns to education can drop during an oil
boom was expounded by Baland and Francois (2000). They provide evidence that during oil booms,
individuals move into rent seeking activities because opportunities and potential beneﬁts increase
dramatically. If the ability to move to rent seeking activities reduces at higher levels of education
then the returns to education may fall during a boom. In the Nigerian case, getting involved
in rent seeking activities resulting from a resource boom is linked with social class, connection
with government, network and not education. Therefore, when windfalls occurs in this sector,
the relationship between schooling and income can be attenuated. Therefore, the eﬀects of the
26There is anecdotal evidence that many Nigerians are complaining that the populace is not beneﬁtting from the oil
windfall and many people question the rationale of keeping so much in foreign reserve in a country with a high level of
poverty and low infrastructure development. Although the Nigerian government has increased its expenditures since
1999, there is no jump in the increase in expenditure coinciding with the rise in oil prices.
24democratic reform on returns post 2003 might actually be higher than observed and the oil boom
only serves to attenuate this eﬀect.
A possible argument against the no positive eﬀect of the oil boom on returns is that the oil
sector tends to employ more educated people and so the boom may cause diﬀerential eﬀects across
the population resulting in an increase in returns to education. However, it is important to note
that the oil sector in Nigeria is an enclave sector that employs an insigniﬁcant number of people,
with few linkages in the Nigerian economy. Besides, there is no documented evidence from Nigeria
that the oil sector employs a greater proportion of highly educated people, rather, the oil sector
employs many low level skilled workers, few highly educated Nigerians and most of the highly skilled
workers are expatriates. Furthermore, there was no substantial expansion in the sector in Nigeria
over the years I am considering, despite massive increase in proﬁtability post 2003. It is important to
mention here that Nigeria belongs to OPEC which places restriction on its member in their output.
The only widespread increases in income in the sector were similar to general income increases,
across the private sector in the country, post the minimum wage law and wage reform in the public
sector. There were no documented increases in compensation in this sector coinciding with this
boom. As mention earlier, oil companies have enjoyed high proﬁts over this period of boom but the
signiﬁcant oil companies in Nigeria are multinational and these companies repatriate proﬁts rather
than invest it in Nigeria, which could have created signiﬁcant positive welfare eﬀects. Oﬀ course
the increased taxes paid by these companies, because of the proﬁt increases during this period, adds
to the revenue of the government. However, as highlighted earlier, this increase in revenue to the
government should create only a level welfare eﬀect if any and not an increase in the returns to
education.
5.4 Tests of the Identiﬁcation Strategy
Despite the arguments above, to quell any lingering doubts on the validity of the identiﬁcation
strategy, I provide results excluding 2005 and only comparing 1998, 1999 to 2000. By excluding
2005 I do not have to worry about the potential confounding eﬀect of the oil boom from 2003. The
results in Table 6 show that returns to education increased by over 3 percentage point only a year
after democracy. The swift change in returns post democracy suggests that the increase in returns
was largely driven by the wage reform, initiated immediately post democracy.27 However, given that
the wage reforms caused other general equilibrium eﬀects and coincided with an expansion in the
27In Step 3 of this analysis I provide more evidence of the role of the wage reform in this changes.
25Table 6: Estimates of Returns to Schooling Excluding 2005
Independent Variable
Regime OLS IV FS IV second stage R2
First Stage: Dependent Variable Year of Schooling
UPE Military NA 0.17* 0.36
(0.001)
UPE Democracy (2000) NA 0.13* 0.35
(0.012)
Second Stage: Dependent Variable- Log Income
Yrs of School Military 0.026* 0.031* 0.23
(0.001) (0.001)
Yrs of School Democracy (2000) 0.037* 0.064* 0.26
(0.001) (0.018)
Note: *5% signiﬁcance level
demand for skilled labor, due to democracy led change in business climate and other government
reforms like deregulation and privatization, I cannot make the case that the change in returns is
due solely to the wage reform.28 By comparing the pre democracy years to 2000, one year after
democracy, I provide evidence that the results of a change in returns post democratic reform is not
linked to the confounding eﬀect of the ongoing oil boom, which started in 2003.
Another possible argument is that the results could simply reﬂect a trend or a general increase
in returns to education over time. To provide evidence that this is not the case, I estimate the
returns to education for each year individually. 1998, 1999, 2000 are years that follow each other.
If this is simply a trend, then the change in returns to education between 1998 and 1999 should
be similar to the change between 1999 and 2000. Table 7 highlights the returns for the four years
separately. The results provide evidence again a simple trend eﬀect. First there is no statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the returns to education between 1998 and 1999, in fact the returns fell
slightly. If the change in returns followed a trend, then similar to 1998 and 1999, there should be
no signiﬁcant change in returns between 1999 and 2000. However, there is a 3.4 percentage point
increase in returns between 1999 and 2000. This increase may sound unbelievable if one was not
aware of the potential immediate impacts of a wage reform. Interestingly, the returns dip between
2000 and 2005. This fall as highlighted earlier might be due to the increasing return to rent seeking
activities during an oil boom. As mentioned previously, there is evidence that returns to education
28See Folawewo 2007 for an analysis of the impact of the wage increase and Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako,
(2007) for the progress from policy reforms.
26drops during oil booms and the 2003 oil boom might have led to the decrease in returns from 0.064
in 2000 to 0.04 in 2005, despite continued progressive economic reforms. Oil prices in 2005 are much
higher than in any other boom year and though returns have fallen from 2000 to 2005, returns in
2005 are still higher than in 1998 and 1999 when oil prices were lower. Hence, the oil boom cannot
solely explain the changes in returns to schooling between 2000 and 2005 though it might have a
role to play in the fall in returns between those years.
Table 7: Returns to Education by year
1998 1999 2000 2005
Pre Democracy Post Democracy
First Stage: Dependent Variable- Yrs Schooling
0.15* 0.19* 0.13* 0.16*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Second Stage: Dependent Variable -Log Income
OLS 0.026* 0.027* 0.037* 0.045*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IV 0.034* 0.030* 0.064* 0.040*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Apart from the arguments stated above, another possible issue that can arise when comparing
returns before and after democracy is the population being evaluated. One could argue that the
change in the returns to education is not driven by democratic reform but rather by change in
the population observed. To check for evidence of such a problem, ﬁrst I compared descriptive
statistics for the data sample across the four years noting no signiﬁcant issue. I present some of
these summary statistics in Table 1. In addition, all four-survey years are comparable because similar
sampling methodology are used each year. However, to fully deal with change in the population
argument, I follow speciﬁc cohorts pre and post democracy, those born before 1982. The choice of
cohorts born before 1982 is also important because the instrument does not aﬀect those born after
this period and IV estimates could be noisy without this restriction. Also, most individuals born
after 1981 are not in the workforce in the late 90s prior to democracy. However by 2005, some of
those born after 1981 are in the work force. If the returns to education is estimated for the whole
working population in 2005, then it becomes more problematic to attribute pre and post diﬀerences
solely to democratic reform. Such diﬀerences could be due to unique characteristics of the new
entrants into the workforce.
275.5 Step 3: Democratic reform versus Democracy
Rationale for Testing Hypothesis 2
The results from step two imply that oil though a potential confounding factor is not driving the
resulting impact of democratic reform on returns. As a ﬁnal test to provide evidence that the change
in returns pre and post democracy can be linked to democratic reform, I test two hypothesis. First
I test that there is no diﬀerential change in returns to education across levels of education, post
democratic reform in Nigeria. Second, there is no diﬀerential change in returns to education across
occupation sectors, post democratic reform in Nigeria.
Why are these tests relevant? These tests will provide evidence on whether the changes in returns
to education post democracy are as a result of just a change in political system to democracy versus
the choice of polices implemented by the democratic government. In addition if we ﬁnd diﬀerences
in the change in return to education across levels of education and occupational sectors, and the
groups with higher beneﬁts coincide with the target group of policy reforms that took place, we
have indirectly showed that the changes are indeed due to reforms and not democracy per se and
other confounding factors.29
It is important to emphasize again that most of the policies implemented post democracy that
could have short-term impacts on returns had a direct impact on those with more education.30 In
addition, the wage reform directly aﬀected only those who work for the government, with substantial
income changes for highly educated government workers. The spill-over eﬀect of this increase for
government workers, as explained in section 3.2, will lead to changes in income in the formal private
sector especially those at higher levels of education. However, the change in the short-run in the
formal sector will be less than those in the government sector. Hence wage workers in the private
sector should see a boost in their returns but not as much as those who work for government. In
contrast, those who are self employed are less likely to beneﬁt in the short-run from the wage reform
but ceteris paribus may beneﬁt in the long run because of the general equilibrium eﬀects.
Given the arguments above, I predict that if changes in returns to education are due to democratic
reform, both null hypothesis will be rejected. Changes in returns will diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
education level, occupation sector and type of employment. In particular, much higher changes
in returns to education should occur for those with higher levels of education (tertiary), wage
29Notice that the wage reform and minimum wage were implemented before the oil boom. This means one cannot
argue that the oil boom was used to sponsor the wage changes in the government sector.
30Speciﬁcally the wage reform, the introduction of UBE, the introduction of private universities, the deregulation of
telecommunication, the change in government appointments and contracts assignments to education based criterions.
28workers and those working for the government while small or no changes should occur for the other
comparison groups (those with less than a tertiary education, self employed, non governmental
sectors).
Estimation Strategy to Test these Hypotheses
To provide evidence that the change in returns can be explained by democratic reform, First I test
that there is no diﬀerential changes in returns to education across levels of education post democratic
reform in Nigeria. I analyze the return to education at diﬀerent levels of education by estimating
the return to an extra year of schooling at each level of education using OLS on a Mincer type wage
equation (see equation 3) before and after democracy. Second, I test that there is no diﬀerential
change in returns to education between self employed and wage workers post democratic reform. I
estimate a simple mincer equation like equation (1) for self employed and wage earners separately
pre and post democracy and calculate the change if any in returns to education for each group.
Third, I estimate a simple mincer equation for government workers, those who work for companies
and others pre and post democracy and similar to the strategy for the earlier hypothesis, I compute
the change in returns to education over these two periods if any.
log(Y ) = α2 + γ2X + δ2X2 + β1yrpri + β2yrsec + β3yruniv + λ2Z + ǫ1 (3)
where X is age, Z is the matrix of all relevant control variables and year dummies, yrpri is years of
primary education, yrsec is years of secondary education and yruniv is years of tertiary education
and ǫ is the error term.
The estimation of returns at diﬀerent levels of education is identical to the estimation strategy
used by Aromolaran (2004). However, in contrast to Aromolaran (2004), I use more controls in the
wage equation. Moreover, while Aromolaran only looked at the pre democracy period, I estimate
the returns to diﬀerent levels of education pre and post democratic reform. The three hypothesis
above are estimated using OLS, meaning there is a potential for a bias in the estimate of returns
to education. The potential for this bias stems from the omitted variable, ability. I do not worry
too much about this possibility, ﬁrst, because in estimates of the average returns to education using
the IV, the bias in OLS was not substantial. Second the eﬀect of ability will be more signiﬁcant in
an estimation of the returns to an extra year of schooling than in the estimation of the returns to
an extra year of secondary, tertiary and primary education. This is because ability is not likely to
play a role in deciding the years of schooling at each levels of education in Nigeria but plays a role
29in the total years of schooling an individual attains. This is true because national and state exam
tied to ability have to be taken to move between levels of education in Nigeria. Especially in the
decision to move between secondary and tertiary levels of education. Given this scenario in Nigeria,
I do not expect a signiﬁcant ability bias in the estimate of the returns at each level of education,
but we cannot rule out the possibility.
I cannot use the IV in this part of the analysis for two reasons. First, with the estimation of the
returns at diﬀerent levels of education, the estimation will be underidentiﬁed because their is only
one instrument and three potentially endogenous variables. Second, when we break the population
by sector the sample size is much smaller for government and private sector workers. This creates
a lot of noise in the instrument increasing the potential of the weak instrument problem.
Despite this constraint to the estimates, given that the interest here is the comparison among
education levels in changes in returns post reform, the inferences from our hypothesis should be
valid whether or not estimates are biased, if bias is not time variant. There is no reason to believe
that the impact of ability on the estimate of the returns to a particular level of education, if it exists,
will change over time.31
5.6 Econometric Results for Question 2
Table 8: Returns to an Extra Year of Schooling at Diﬀerent Education Levels
Year Pre Democracy Post Democracy Diﬀerence
1997/98 1998/99 pooled 2000 2005 pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Yrs of Primary 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.028* 0.032* 0.03* 0.011*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Yrs of Secondary 0.017* 0.016* 0.017* 0.001 0.020 0.014* -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Yrs of Tertiary 0.095* 0.010* 0.098* 0.161* 0.177* 0.16* 0.062*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *5% signiﬁcance level
In Table 8 the estimates of the return for an extra year of primary, secondary and tertiary
education are summarized. In comparison to Aromolaran (2004) estimates, these estimates of the
returns to diﬀerent levels of education are lower by about 2-percentage points. This diﬀerence is
31The only possible scenario is when the standard or criteria for education advancement drops i.e., it becomes easier
to pass each level or grade. There is no evidence of this in the Nigerian case for the cohort considered. However the
introduction of private universities with lower entry barriers from 2000 might make time variant ability biases possible
in future cohorts.
30primarily because he does not control for sector, or location, which are important determinants of
income in Nigeria. The results show that return to an extra year of primary education is very low.
Even though the returns to an extra year of primary education increased post democracy, it only
increased by a percentage point. The return for an extra year of secondary education is surprisingly
lower. Unlike in Aromolaran (2004), I ﬁnd lower returns to secondary education than primary
education. This is quite a surprise given Schultz view that the return to schooling rises with years
of schooling in Africa (Schultz, 2004). Interestingly, this disturbing trend continues post democracy.
With near zero returns to an extra year of secondary education in 2000 but picking up by 2005
but still lower than the returns to an extra year of primary education. On average post democracy,
returns to an extra year of secondary education has increased by less than one percentage point.32
The big diﬀerence lies in the returns to tertiary education. Aromolaran (2004) also noted high
returns to tertiary education. The estimates here are slightly lower than his estimates for the period
he considered, 1998-1999. Table 8 shows that the return to tertiary education rose from 10% in 1999
to about 18% point for every extra year of schooling in 2005. On average post democratic reform,
returns to increased by an equivalent of about 6% points. Even though returns post democracy was
statistically diﬀerent from returns pre reform at the primary and tertiary level, the increase at the
tertiary level is statistically and substantially diﬀerent from the other two levels of education (6.2
percentage point increase to 1.1).
Based on these results, the null hypothesis is once again rejected. There are diﬀerential changes
in the returns to schooling post reforms with substantial beneﬁts solely at the tertiary level of
education. Finding most of the beneﬁts at the tertiary level of education is in consonance with
our predictions given the speciﬁc reforms that took place post democracy. In addition, this ﬁnding
supports the argument that the changes post democracy in returns are induced by reforms and not
by oil. Notice that even if we exclude 2005, the results from testing this hypothesis still hold.
In Table 9, the estimates of the returns to education by occupational sector are summarized. In
the ﬁrst part of the table, I compare those who are wage workers (work for pay) to those who are self-
employed (work for proﬁt). Notice that the change in returns to education for those who are wage
workers is twice as high as the change in returns for those who are self employed. This diﬀerence
still exists even if we exclude 2005 and is somewhat magniﬁed (more than double the change for self-
employed). My ﬁnding is in consonance with the prediction that short term eﬀects of the democratic
32It is possible that lower returns to secondary education than primary education can be supply induced. However,
this is not the case in Nigeria as increase in the supply of labor post democracy was similar across both levels. Little
increases in the demand for semi-skilled labor as described in the section above is a more relevant explanation.
31Table 9: Average Returns to Schooling by Occupation Sector
Year Pre Democracy Post Democracy Diﬀerence
1997/98 1998/99 pooled 2000 2005 pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Work for Pay 0.031* 0.029* 0.03* 0.048* 0.051* 0.049* 0.019
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Work for Proﬁt 0.022* 0.022* 0.022* 0.029* 0.031* 0.031* 0.009
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Occupation Sectors
Company 0.036* 0.035* 0.036* 0.052* 0.038* 0.044* 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Government 0.034* 0.03* 0.033* 0.052* 0.066* 0.057* 0.024
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Others 0.022* 0.022* 0.023* 0.029* 0.032* 0.031* 0.009
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: *5% signiﬁcance level
reform would be felt more by those who are wage workers. This prediction makes sense given that
minimum wage reform is directly relevant to wage workers. To show more speciﬁcally that a lot of
the shift is truly due to this speciﬁc reform, I break down those working by type of employment.
Working for a company, working for the government and others, which is primarily the self employed.
While there was a 2.4 percentage point increase in returns to education for government workers,
there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the change in returns for self-employed and those working in
companies. Meaning that the increase in returns to educations for wage workers is driven primarily
by increases to government workers. This ﬁnding once again highlights the importance of the wage
reform whose direct beneﬁciaries are those who work for government. Again if we exclude 2005,
the results do not change. The only diﬀerence is that the change in returns is signiﬁcantly higher
for company workers relative to self employed if we exclude 2005. This results suggest that returns
to education seems to have decreased for company workers by 2005. This decrease could be due
to several reasons including a potential attenuating eﬀect of oil booms on returns to education.
In addition the decrease could be explained by an initial response to match the changing wages
in the government sector in the formal non government sector, and a decline afterwards given the
abundance of skilled labor and the limit in government employment. Also, the sample of company
workers contains both skilled and unskilled labor and the noted decrease in average return may be
driven by an increase in the number of less educated wage workers in the 2005 sample. This scenario
is highly possible given the change in the investment climate post democratic reform and the return
32of several businesses, by 2003, many of which rely on semi and unskilled workers.33.
Could the result above lead to the conclusion that the changes in returns to education are
linked only to wage reform and has nothing to do with other democratic reforms or democracy in
Nigeria? The answer is no. First it took a democratic government in the Nigerian case to care
enough to deal with the wage rigidities. For more than 10 years Nigeria was under military rule and
there was no inclination to raise wages. I do not however deny the fact that a benevolent dictator
could do the same. Nevertheless it took a democracy in Nigeria to implement it and this should
be acknowledged. Also, there are changes in returns to education in the formal non-governmental
sector and even among those who are self employed (about 1 percentage point increase). In addition,
the noted changes in the returns in other sectors could suggest spill over eﬀects of the wage reform
or just the short-run beneﬁts of other reforms like the general focus on education, the deregulations
of key sectors, the restructuring of the banking sector and the general change in the investment
climate in Nigeria. Recall from table 8 we see a an increase in returns to education for all skilled
labor. This increase in return is present in all sectors. This is why though it is tempting to say
these eﬀects are purely a wage reform eﬀect, such a conclusion could be misleading.
6 Summary, Implication and Policy Recommendations
6.1 Summary
In this paper I try to understand what can aﬀect returns to education or cause it to be low. I review
previous arguments on low returns to education and test the possible argument that reforms and
change in institutions can aﬀect returns to education, using the unique case of Nigeria. Nigeria had a
drastic change in institutions from military to democracy post the sudden death of the military ruler.
This change in institutions was followed by dramatics economic and labor market reforms. I ask the
question did returns to education change signiﬁcantly post 1999 (democracy) and can we attribute
this change in returns if it exists to political and labor market reforms or does this change reﬂect
other confounding factors that coincide with the post democracy period? I answer this question
using diﬀerent techniques and test three null hypotheses. First, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between returns to education pre and post democracy in Nigeria. Second, there is no diﬀerential
change in returns to education across levels of education post democratic reform in Nigeria. Third,
there is no diﬀerential change in returns to education across occupation sectors post democratic
33Recall that the results in table 8 show that substantial changes in returns are only noted for those with tertiary
education. Those at the primarily and secondary level had very little changes in returns.
33reform.
I show despite the oil boom, that started in 2003 and can serve as a confounding factor, the
results in this paper can be attributed to democratic reform. We made use of a good instrument for
schooling based on the exogenous timing of the implementation of free education to estimate the
average return to schooling for a speciﬁc cohort of people before democracy and post democracy.
The null hypothesis that returns were the same for the two periods is rejected. The average returns
to schooling increased by about 2.6 percentage points post democracy. In addition the two other
null hypotheses are rejected. The change in returns post democratic reform diﬀered across education
level. Implying that low returns to schooling could be explained in part by institutions, regime and
government policy choice and reforms can increase the returns to education. In addition, returns
to primary and secondary levels of education are extremely low pre and post democracy. I ﬁnd
that changes in returns to education diﬀered among wage workers and those who are self employed,
which serves as further evidence of the thesis that the change in returns post democracy is linked
with the post democratic reform. Most of the reforms implemented post democracy have shortrun
beneﬁts closely linked with those who are wage earners, work for government and have higher levels
of education. Speciﬁcally, I know that the wage reform played a signiﬁcant role in the change
in returns to education post reform especially for the educated government worker. The results
show clearly that those working for the government experienced the largest boost in their returns.
However, it would be misleading to say that changes in returns to education post democracy are
caused by the wage reform. Instead, short-run changes in returns to education, post democracy,
can be attributed to democratic reform and a signiﬁcant portion of that change can be attributed
to the wage policy, which was part of these reforms.
6.2 Implications of Results
The results have some important implications. First, low average returns to schooling in Nigeria
is more a reﬂection of the low return at the primary and secondary levels of education. Hence,
low average returns to education in Nigeria masks heterogeneity across education levels. Take for
example, Uwaifo (2007) ﬁnds average returns to education to be 2.8% in 1998-1999 which is very
low. However, the returns for every extra year of tertiary education was 9.8% while the returns to an
extra year of primary and secondary education was 1.9% and 1.7% respectively. Hence, low average
returns to education to Nigeria can be explained in part by disparity in returns across levels.
Second, democratic reform can lead to an increase in the returns to schooling. However, the
34choice of policies by the democratic government in Nigeria has not led to equal beneﬁts across levels
of education. The primary beneﬁciaries of the increase post democratic reform, in terms of returns
are those with tertiary education.34
Third, despite increases in the average returns to education post democratic reform, there were
only marginal increases at the primary level and no increase at the secondary level. This result
suggests that though reforms impact returns, other factors are necessary to be able to understand
fully the low return to schooling at the secondary and primary levels.
6.3 Recommendations & Conclusions
In terms of policy recommendation, ﬁrst, low returns at the secondary and primary education
is a signiﬁcant problem that needs attention. Although military rule had a role to play in this
outcome, returns have remain dismal for these levels of education post democratic reform. Part of
the explanation for the lack of signiﬁcant increase in returns at these level is the choice of policies
post democracy that favored those with tertiary education. However, the low quality of public
primary and secondary education is another possible explanation that can be investigated through
government sponsored academic research. Without a clear understanding of the causes of the low
returns to these levels of education, policy recommendation cannot be prescribed.
Second, with the high and increasing return to tertiary education, government should not subsi-
dize tertiary education. Rather, more resources should be channeled to public primary and secondary
levels of education. Also, the newly elected democratic government35 needs to maintain political
stability, continue economic reform, and improve security. The recent happenings with regards to
religious clashes, increased armed robbery and kidnapping of oil workers in the Delta region are
discouraging, and could reduce the willingness to invest in Nigeria and negatively aﬀect returns to
schooling.
In conclusion, poor governance, weak policies and bad institutions pre democracy led to labor
market failures that attenuated the average returns to schooling. The exact ranking of these factors
in terms of the impact on the return to education cannot be isolated in this analysis. However, a
movement to democracy with wide spread democratic reform has led to a signiﬁcant increase in the
average returns to education. Though Nigeria experienced an oil boom coinciding in part with the
democratic period, I show that the results are not driven by this potentially confounding factor.
34There is anecdotal evidence of a signiﬁcant drop in immigration of highly skilled Nigerians post democracy. The
increase in returns at the tertiary level to comparable levels in other countries might explain this fall.
35Nigeria began another presidential term May 2007.
35Hence as in Fleisher et al (2005), one can infer that the return to schooling is aﬀected by reforms
that aﬀect the labor market in general. In addition, a low average return to schooling in Nigeria is
more a reﬂection of the low return at the primary and secondary levels of education.
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